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The Contextuality of Scheme-(In)Dependence 
in Pragmatist Metaphysics
Abstract
This paper discusses a modern, especially pragmatist, variant of the Kantian issue of 
the mind- or scheme-dependence of ontology. It is suggested that the distinction between 
scheme-dependence and scheme-independence in (pragmatist) transcendental metaphysics 
is itself contextual, not absolute, and that this contextuality is a “transcendental fact” about 









conceptual	 schemes,	 practices,	 language-games,	 forms	 of	 life,	 paradigms,	
points	of	view,	or	something	similar.	Among	the	historically	influential	de-
fenders	of	key	variations	of	this	“dependence	thesis”	–	starting	already	from	





may	 call	 a	 ‘thing’	 depends	on	our	 purposes	 and	 selective	 interests),	F.	C.	
S.	 Schiller	 (we	 “humanistically”	 construct	 the	 world	 and	 all	 truths	 about	
it	within	our	purposive	practices),	John	Dewey	(the	objects	of	 inquiry	are	
constructed	in	and	through	inquiry,	instead	of	existing	as	“ready-made”	prior	
to	 inquiry),	Rudolf	Carnap	 (ontological	questions	about	whether	 there	are	






choosing	one	or	another	 linguistic	 framework),	W.	V.	O.	Quine	 (ontology	
is	 not	 absolute	 but	 relative	 to	 a	 theory,	 language,	 or	 translation	 scheme),	
Ludwig	Wittgenstein	(the	“essence”	of	things	lies	in	“grammar”,	thus	in	the	
language-games	we	engage	in,	instead	of	transcending	our	language-use	and	
“form	 of	 life”),	 Hilary	 Putnam	 (there	 is	 no	 “ready-made	 world”	 but	 only	
scheme-internal	objects),	Nelson	Goodman	(we	“make	worlds”,	or	“world	
versions”,	 by	 employing	 our	 various	 symbol	 systems),	 Thomas	 S.	 Kuhn	
(different	scientific	paradigms	constitute	different	“worlds”),	Richard	Rorty	





the	 implicated	 distinction	 between	 a	 conceptual	 scheme	 and	 its	 allegedly	
scheme-neutral	 content,	 or	 other	 noteworthy	 criticisms	 of	 conceptual	 and	
ontological	relativism.1
In	their	distinctive	ways,	these	and	many	other	thinkers	have	suggested	that	
there	 is	no	absolute	world	an sich that	we	could	meaningfully	conceptual-







matist	 should	 not	 simply	 opt	 for	 antirealism	 or	 radical	 constructivism	 and	
relativism	in	ontology	but,	 rather,	seek	a	moderate	pragmatic	realism	com-
patible	with	naturalism.	The	problem	is	how	to	combine	the	(transcendental)	
scheme-dependence	of	 entities2	with	 their	pragmatic	 scheme-independence	

































See,	 e.g.:	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft	(1781/1787),	ed.	Raymund	Schmidt	
(Hamburg:	 Felix	 Meiner,	 1990);	 William	
James,	Pragmatism: A New Name for Some 
Old Ways of Thinking	(1907),	eds.	Frederick	
H.	 Burkhardt,	 Fredson	 Bowers,	 and	 Ignas	
K.	 Skrupskelis	 (Cambridge,	 MA	 and	 Lon-
don:	Harvard	University	Press,	1975);	F.C.S.	
Schiller,	Pragmatism and Humanism: Selected 
Writings 1891–1939,	eds.	John	R.	Shook	and	
H.	P.	MacDonald	(Amherst,	NY:	Prometheus/
Humanity	 Books,	 2008);	 John	 Dewey,	 The 
Quest for Certainty: A Study on the Relation 
between Knowledge and Action	(1929)	(New	
York:	 G.	 P.	 Putnam’s	 Sons,	 1960);	 Rudolf	
Carnap,	 “Empiricism,	Semantics,	Ontology”	




(1948),	 in:	Ontological Relativity and Other 




Putnam,	 Reason, Truth and History	 (Cam-
bridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1981);	
Hilary	Putnam,	Realism with a Human Face,	
ed.	James	Conant	(Cambridge,	MA	and	Lon-
don:	Harvard	University	Press,	1990);	Nelson	
Goodman,	 Ways of Worldmaking	 (Indiana-
polis:	Hackett,	1978);	Thomas	S.	Kuhn,	The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions,	 2nd	 ed.	
(Chicago:	The	 University	 of	 Chicago	 Press,	
1970	[1st	ed.	1962]);	Richard	Rorty,	Philoso-
phy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton,	NJ:	
Princeton	 University	 Press,	 1979);	 Richard	
Rorty,	 Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 
(Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
1991);	 Wilfrid	 Sellars,	 Science, Perception 
and Reality	 (London:	 Routledge	 and	 Kegan	
Paul,	1963).	For	Davidson’s	seminal	critique	
of	 the	 scheme–content	 distinction	 and	 the	




















ontological	 (in)dependence	 must	 be	 distin-







For	 more	 detailed	 discussions	 of	 ontologi-
cal	 dependence	 and	 independence,	 see	 E.	 J.	
Lowe,	 The Possibility of Metaphysics: Sub-
stance, Identity and Time	(Oxford:	Clarendon	
Press,	1998);	and	Lowe,	The Four-Category 
Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for 
Natural Science	 (Oxford:	 Clarendon	 Press,	
2006).	Here	I	must	ignore	the	differences	be-
tween,	 say,	 Lowe’s	 “rigid”	 and	 “non-rigid”	
notions	 of	 ontological	 dependence.	 Lowe’s	
metaphysically	 realist	 (very	 anti-pragmatist)	
ontology	 makes	 the	 interesting	 twist	 of	 re-
garding	persons	as	a	metaphysically	primitive	









aphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds 






For	 a	 comprehensive	discussion	of	 the	 real-
ism	 issue	 in	 the	 pragmatist	 tradition	 up	 to	
mid-1990s,	 see	 Sami	 Pihlström,	 Structuring 
the World: The Issue of Realism and the Na-




































The	 contextualization	 I	 am	 trying	 to	 articulate	 amounts	 to	 a	 kind	 of	 prag-
matic	 “naturalization”	of	Kantian	 transcendental	 idealism.7	Given	 the	kind	
of	 creatures	 we	 (context-embeddedly)	 are,	 we	 are	 fully	 naturally	 situated	













While	 I	 just	 said	 that	 contexts	 are	 “entities”,	 given	 a	 broad	 understanding	
of	“entity”,	it	is	very	important	to	acknowledge	their	specific	way	of	being.	
Contextuality	 is	generality;	 contexts	 are,	 though	 perhaps	 entities,	 certainly	
not	particulars.	 Instead,	 they	are	what	enables	us	 to	ontologically	postulate	















However,	 the	 transcendental	 scheme-independence	 that	 I	 am	 describing	 in	
terms	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 contextuality	 must	 not,	 as	 Robert	 Hanna	 points	 out	
(more	explicitly	in	connection	with	Kant	scholarship),	be	understood	as	de-
pendence	on	human	biology	or	dependence	on	social	consensus,	but	instead	








play	 the	 role	of	 transcendental	 facts,	 comparable	 to	what	may	 in	 the	Kan-
tian	framework	be	called	“transcendental	facts”	about	the	irreducible	differ-


















tion	 and	 a	 (harmful)	 dichotomy,	 see	 Hilary	
Putnam,	 The Collapse of the Fact/Value 
Dichotomy and Other Essays	 (Cambridge,	












See	 Ludwig	 Wittgenstein,	 On Certainty,	
trans.	 G.	 E.	 M.	 Anscombe	 and	 Denis	 Paul	
(Oxford:	 Basil	 Blackwell,	 1969).	 The	 pur-
pose	of	this	paper	is	not	to	explore	this	or	any	







tion	 to	 the	 Peircean	 (and	 generally	 pragma-
tist)	 notion	 of	 habits	 of	 action,	 emphasizing	





by	Peirce	on	 this	 topic	 range	 from	his	early	
(1871)	Berkeley	review	to	his	late	essays	on	
pragmatism	 and	 pragmaticism	 (1905–1907),	
available	in	Charles	S.	Peirce,	The Essential 





constructivistically:	 we	 constitute	 generality	
(contextually,	 as	 suggested	 here).	Yet,	 when	
subordinated	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 pragmatism	 I	
am	 proposing	 as	 a	 framework	 of	 any	 meta-
physical	 inquiry,	 Peircean	 “real	 generals”,	
including	 contexts,	 should definitely	 be	 on-
tologically	 postulated	 –	 though,	 again,	 only	
contextually.	
10
Robert	 Hanna,	 Kant and the Foundations 

















ther	 grounded	 or	 metaphysically	 explained	 by	 anything	 more	 fundamental	
–	that	is,	with	reference	to	anything	non-contextual.	Even	this	fact	about	the	
contextuality	of	 the	fact	 that	 the	scheme-independence	vs.	scheme-depend-




My	picture	of	 the	contextuality	of	whatever	 there	 is,	and	the	contextuality	
of	 drawing	 the	distinction	between	what	 there	 is	 scheme-dependently	 and	
scheme-independently,	is	undeniably	circular,	but	hardly	viciously	circular.	


















































































conceptual	 development	 in	 terms	 of	 causal	
clashes	of	vocabularies	–	a	version	of	the	sur-
vival	of	the	fittest	–	is	too	reductive	from	the	
perspective	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 pragmatism	 I	 am	
trying	 to	 develop.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Richard	 Rorty,	




ture	 of	 naturalized	 and	 pragmatic	 transcen-




William	 James,	 The Varieties of Religious 
Experience	 (1902),	 eds.	 Frederick	 H.	 Burk-
hardt,	Fredson	Bowers,	and	Ignas	K.	Skrup-
skelis	(Cambridge,	MA	and	London:	Harvard	
University	 Press,	 1985),	 p.	 53;	 also	 quoted	
in	Michael	R.	Slater,	“Pragmatism,	Realism,	
and	Religion”,	Journal of Religious Ethics	36	
(2008),	pp.	653–681	(see	p.	675).
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ability	ought	 to	be	philosophically	settled	 is	 itself	a	question	 that	can	only	














construct	 for	ourselves.	What	our	contexts	are is,	again,	 itself	a	contextual	




















sity,	 in	 a	 (quasi-)transcendental	 sense,	with	non-absoluteness	 and	 reflexive	
contextuality.	What	we	have	here	is	only	necessity	in	a	context,	relativized	to	
a	certain	use	of	concepts,	a	certain	practice-laden	way	of	viewing	the	world.	













the	Wittgensteinian	 impossibility	of	a	private	 language	(or,	say,	 the	 impos-




Cf.	Putnam,	The Collapse of the Fact/Value 




Richard	Rorty,	Philosophy as Cultural Poli-
tics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	










or	Continuity?”,	Journal of Philosophical Re-
search	35	(2010),	pp.	323–352.
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For	 Putnam’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 internal	 real-
ist	 (epistemic)	 theory	 of	 truth,	 see	 Hilary	
Putnam,	 The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, 
and World	(New	York:	Columbia	University	
Press,	 1999).	 For	 discussions	 of	 Putnam’s	
struggle	 with	 realism	 and	 pragmatism,	 see	









and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Limits”,	 in	 Sami	 Pihl-
ström	 (ed.),	 Wittgenstein and the Method of 






of	 such	 philosophical	 or	 metaphilosophical	
theses	as	pragmatic	contextualism.
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On	 the	 concept	 of	 truthmaking	 in	 metaphy-
sics,	see	D.	M.	Armstrong,	Truth and Truth-
makers	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	









formative Philosophy: Socrates, Wittgenstein, 
and the Democratic Spirit of Philosophy	



































vestigation	 of	 any	 pragmatist	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 contextuality	 of	 scheme-
(in)dependence,	and	hence	of	the	empirical	vs.	transcendental	distinction	that	





investigations	 of,	 say,	 the	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 contextualization	 thesis	
based	upon	different	ontological	dependence	relations	are	needed.28
4. Concluding remarks 
    (and some final worries)




















































This	 is	 further	defended	 in	Pihlström,	Natu-



















jects	 in	 the	 world	 –	 developed	 in	 Carr,	 The 


























for	 the	entire	post-Kantian	 literature	on	 the	“dependence”	of	 things	on	 the	
transcendental	(yet	revisable)	schemes	(etc.)	through	which	we	identify	them,	










Kontekstualnost shematske (ne)uvjetovanosti 
u	pragmatičkoj	metafizici
Sažetak
Ovaj članak razmatra modernu, posebice pragmatičku, varijantu kantovskog problema umske 
ili shematske uvjetovanosti ontologije. Tvrdi se da je razlika između shematske uvjetovanosti 
i shematske neuvjetovanosti u (pragmatičkoj) transcendentalnoj metafizici kontekstualna, ne 






Die Kontextualität der Schema(un)abhängigkeit 
in der pragmatischen Metaphysik
Zusammenfassung
Das Paper erwägt eine moderne, vornehmlich pragmatische Variante der kantischen Frage-
stellung hinsichtlich der Verstandes- und Schemaabhängigkeit der Ontologie. Man lässt darauf 
schließen, die Distinktion zwischen der Schemaabhängigkeit und –unabhängigkeit in der (prag-
matischen) transzendentalen Metaphysik sei an sich kontextuell, nicht absolut, bzw. eine solche 










La contextualité de l’(in)dépendance schématique 
dans la métaphysique pragmatique
Résumé
Cet article traite de la variante moderne, notamment pragmatique, du problème kantien de la 
dépendance de l’ontologie de la raison et des schèmes. Il est suggéré que la distinction entre la 
dépendance et l’indépendance schématique dans la métaphysique transcendantale (pragmati-
que) est elle-même contextuelle, pas absolue, et que cette contextualité est un « fait transcen-
dantal » concernant nos activités constitutives du monde ancrées dans la pratique.
Mots-clés
Pragmatisme,	 ontologie,	 métaphysique,	 réalisme,	 schèmes	 conceptuels,	 idéalisme	 trascendantal,	
contextes,	contextualisme
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